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EVIDENCE RULE 502:  THE SOLUTION TO THE 
PRIVILEGE-PROTECTION PUZZLE IN 
THE DIGITAL ERA 
John M. Barkett* 
INTRODUCTION 
The inadvertent production of privileged or work-product protected 
documents1 is a genuine risk in litigation today because of the magnitude of 
electronically stored information (ESI) and the electronic transmission 
habits of individuals who send and receive privileged communications.2  In 
the digital era, it is too easy to replicate electronic documents.  Even the 
most well-intended individual might propagate email unthinkingly, creating 
nightmares for parties trying to extract at a reasonable cost all privileged 
documents from an electronic production. 
Lawyers are, or should be, genuinely concerned about how to solve this 
privilege-protection puzzle.  Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct obliges lawyers to protect the privileged information of their 
clients.3  Model Rule 1.6(c), which went into effect in August 2012, adds a 
specific requirement that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to 
 
*  Mr. Barkett is a partner at the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. in its Miami 
office.  Mr. Barkett is a commercial litigator (contract and corporate disputes, employment, 
trademark, and antitrust), environmental litigator (CERCLA, RCRA, and toxic tort), and, for 
the past several years, a peacemaker and problem solver, serving as an arbitrator, mediator, 
facilitator, or allocator in a variety of environmental, commercial, or reinsurance contexts.  
Mr. Barkett is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Miami School of Law where 
he teaches a class on E-Discovery, a topic he has written extensively about.  In March 2012, 
Chief Justice Roberts appointed Mr. Barkett to serve on the Advisory Committee for Civil 
Rules of the Federal Judicial Conference. 
 1. In this Essay, as a convention, I frequently refer only to “privileged” documents 
instead of “privileged and work-product protected” documents, recognizing that work-
product can be entitled to less protection than attorney-client communications. 
 2. In the author’s experience, this risk is as great for plaintiffs and defendants, whether 
they are individuals or business entities. 
 3. Model Rule 1.6(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by 
paragraph (b).” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2012).  Model Rule 1.6(b) 
permits disclosure of information relating to the representation of a client in limited 
circumstances. See id. at R. 1.6(b).  The Model Rules do not directly govern the conduct of 
lawyers; state rules of professional conduct do, and state rules are based on the Model Rules.  
The duty to protect information related to the representation of a client, however, is 
applicable to all lawyers in the United States. 
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prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized 
access to, information relating to the representation of a client.”4 
What are “reasonable efforts” when a privileged document is buried 
within gigabytes or terabytes5 of data?  This is where Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502(d) plays an important role—if lawyers would take advantage 
of the value it brings to solving the privilege-protection puzzle.  In this 
Essay, I explain why lawyers should maximize the use of Rule 502(d) 
orders.  Because my conclusion is intertwined with both a rule of 
professional conduct and a rule of procedure adopted before Rule 502(d) 
was enacted—but with similar purposes—I discuss them first.  I then 
describe the terms of Rule 502, explaining how Rule 502(a) has eliminated 
“subject matter” waiver concerns except where the production of a 
privileged document is intentional, and how Rule 502(b) has standardized 
in federal courts the factors that determine whether the inadvertent 
production of privileged information results in a waiver.  Then I focus on 
the application of Rule 502(b) in recent cases.  Finally, I discuss how Rule 
502(d) can eliminate privilege waiver worries under Rule 502(b) and why a 
properly framed Rule 502(d) order should be routinely sought by litigants in 
federal court. 
I.  MODEL RULE 4.4(B), NOTICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 26, AND 
CLAWBACK AGREEMENTS 
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) was added in 2002 to 
address the receipt by a lawyer of documents or electronically stored 
information6 that the lawyer “knows or reasonably should know” was sent 
inadvertently.7  While Model Rule 4.4(b) does not address substantive legal 
issues concerning return of the documents or privilege waiver, it does 
impose an ethical duty on a recipient to “promptly notify the sender.”8 
Comment 2 to Rule 4.4 suggests that the Rule is not limited to privileged 
documents, but embraces any documents “that [were] mistakenly sent or 
 
 4. Id. R. 1.6(c).  Model Rule 1.6(c) will eventually percolate its way into state rules of 
professional conduct to the extent that it has not already done so. 
 5. “One gigabyte is the equivalent of 500,000 typewritten pages. Large corporate 
computer networks create backup data measured in terabytes, or 1,000,000 megabytes; each 
terabyte represents the equivalent of 500 billion typewritten pages of plain text.” MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).  
 6. The phrase “or electronically stored information” was added to Model Rule 4.4(b) in 
August 2012. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, RESOLUTION 105A, 196–99 (2012).  Whether 
state bar associations adopt the change remains to be seen, as it is unlikely that anyone 
would interpret “document” to exclude electronically stored information, at least for 
purposes of Rule 4.4(b).  Ethics opinions on the propriety of lawyers to explore metadata in 
an electronic document, for example, have been issued by several state bar ethics opinion 
writers without making a distinction between document or electronically stored information. 
See, e.g, ABA, Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 
(2006); D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 341 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/
for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm; Fla. St. Bar. Ass’n, Ethics Op. 06-
2 (2006). 
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b). 
 8. Id. 
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produced by opposing parties or their lawyers.”9  Comment 2 further states 
that whether the lawyer is required to do more than give notice to the 
sender, “such as returning the [original] document . . . is a matter of law 
beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the 
privileged status of a document . . . has been waived.”10 
Model Rule 4.4(b) is a component of the privilege-protection puzzle and 
should play a role in evaluating the conduct of lawyers in a privilege waiver 
analysis under Rule 502.  Rule 4.4(b) may help an inadvertent producer 
where the timeliness of the request to retrieve the privileged information is 
material to the outcome of the request.11 
Rule 4.4(b) also should not be taken lightly by lawyers in litigation.  In 
Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.,12 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
determined that counsel for an employer violated Rule 4.4 when the lawyer 
retrieved privileged emails located in the cache folder of temporary internet 
 
 9. Id. at R. 4.4(b) cmt. 2. 
 10. Id.  Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4 provides:   
Some lawyers may choose to return a document . . . unread, for example, when the 
lawyer learns before receiving [the document] that it was inadvertently sent [to the 
wrong address].  Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the 
decision to voluntarily return such a document . . . is a matter of professional 
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.  See Rules 1.2 and 1.4. 
Id. at R. 4.4(b) cmt. 3.  Lawyers should consider “applicable law” and the Rules of 
Professional Conduct (RPC) and ethics decisions of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is 
offering legal services in evaluating how to proceed under Rule 4.4.  Model Rule 1.2(a) 
provides in pertinent part that:  
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer may take such action on behalf 
of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.  
Id. at R. 1.2(a).  Model Rule 1.4(a) provides in part that a lawyer shall “(2) reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be 
accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter”; and 
“(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the 
lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law.” Id. at R. 1.4(a). 
 11. Rule 4.4 has been adopted in different forms by several states.  The ABA Center for 
Professional Responsibility has collated the various forms of Rule 4.4. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 
CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:  RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS (2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/mrpc_4_4.authcheckdam.pdf.  In New Hampshire, for example, Rule 4.4(b) 
provides that a lawyer that receives privileged material and knows it was inadvertently sent 
“shall promptly notify the sender and shall not examine” the materials.  It further provides 
that the receiving lawyer “shall abide by the sender’s instructions or seek determination by a 
tribunal.” N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008).  In New Jersey, a lawyer is not 
only prohibited from reading the document and must stop reading the document if he or she 
has begun to read it, but also must return the document to the sender:   
A lawyer who receives a document and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
document was inadvertently sent shall not read the document or, if he or she has 
begun to do so, shall stop reading the document, promptly notify the sender, and 
return the document to the sender.  
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2004). 
 12. 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010). 
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files on a former employee’s laptop’s hard drive.13  The court held that 
counsel should have set aside the “arguably privileged messages once 
[counsel] realized they were attorney-client communications.”14  Counsel 
then erred by “failing either to notify its adversary or seek court permission 
before reading further.”15  The matter was remanded to determine what 
sanction to impose, including, potentially, disqualification.16 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26(b)(5)(B), adopted on 
December 1, 2006,17 may help the inadvertent producer as well.  It 
addresses the handling by a recipient of inadvertently produced privileged 
documents after the producing party provides notice of the mistaken 
production.  Specifically, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides that “if information 
produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as 
trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party 
that received the information of the claim and the basis for it.”18  In addition 
to giving notice, which, based on the committee note, should be in writing 
“unless the circumstances preclude it,”19 the producing party must 
“preserve the information until the claim is resolved.”20 
Upon receipt of this notice, the receiving party is obliged to “promptly 
return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; 
must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved.”21  Rule 
 
 13. Id. at 666 (“We find that the Firm’s review of privileged e-mails between Stengart 
and her lawyer, and use of the contents of at least one e-mail in responding to interrogatories, 
fell within the ambit of RPC 4.4(b) and violated that rule.”).  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  The Court said there was no evidence of bad faith since the employer had a 
policy in place that provided that the employer could access employee emails. Id. 
“Nonetheless,” the Court held, the law firm “should have promptly notified opposing 
counsel when it discovered the nature of the e-mails.” Id. 
 16. Id. at 666–67.  The New Jersey Supreme Court issued this instruction to the trial 
court:  “In deciding what sanctions to impose, the trial court should evaluate the seriousness 
of the breach in light of the specific nature of the e-mails, the manner in which they were 
identified, reviewed, disseminated, and used, and other considerations noted by the 
Appellate Division.” Id. at 666.  “As to plaintiff’s request for disqualification, the court 
should also ‘balance competing interests, weighing the need to maintain the highest 
standards of the profession against a client’s right freely to choose his counsel.’” Id. (quoting 
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243 (N.J. 1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The Appellate Division had identified these considerations:   
[T]he content of the emails, whether the information contained in the emails would 
have inevitably been divulged in discovery that would have occurred absent [the 
Firm’s] knowledge of the emails’ content, and the nature of the issues that have 
been or may in the future be pled in either this or the related Chancery action.  
Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 973 A.2d 390, 403 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 18. Id.  The notice also must be more than perfunctory.  The committee note explains 
that it must be “as specific as possible” in identifying the information inadvertently produced 
and must state the basis for the claim. Id. advisory committee’s note. The notice also “should 
be sufficiently detailed so as to enable the receiving party and the court to understand the 
basis for the claim and to determine whether waiver has occurred.” Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 21. Id. 
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26(b)(5)(B) also provides that if the receiving party has already disclosed 
the information before being notified of the claim of privilege, it “must take 
reasonable steps to retrieve the information.”22 
The receiving party may “promptly present the information to the court 
under seal for a determination of the claim.”23  The committee note 
provides that in presenting the question to the district court, “the party may 
use the content of the information only to the extent permitted by the 
applicable law of privilege, protection for trial-preparation material, and 
professional responsibility.”24 
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not give the producing party a time period within 
which to give notice of the production of privileged or protected 
documents.  The Rule, by design, stays out of the battle of whether the 
producing party’s delay in giving notice results in a waiver of the privilege 
or protection.  The committee note states:  “Courts will continue to examine 
whether a claim of privilege or protection was made at a reasonable time 
when delay is part of the waiver determination under the governing law.”25 
Some litigants seek to eliminate the risk of waiver or reduce the cost of a 
privilege review by entering into nonwaiver agreements by stipulation or 
through a court order.  These agreements allow a producing party to “claw 
back” privileged documents inadvertently produced even after an opposing 
party has had a “quick peek” of the privileged documents.26  FRCP 
26(f)(3)(D) supports this kind of agreement.27  It provides that counsel, in 
the “meet and confer” session required under Rule 26, must consider 
whether they can agree that the court should enter an order protecting the 
right to assert any privilege or protection after production of the privileged 
or protected information.28  In making this change to Rule 26, the Advisory 
Committee suggested that parties consider use of “quick-peek” and 
“clawback” agreements to minimize the risk of a privilege waiver and to 
reduce the costs of litigation.29 
 
 22. Id.  The receiving party, in effect, must keep control over copies that have been 
made of the privileged or protected documents.  In today’s litigation world, where document 
copies can proliferate, that may not be an easy task. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. advisory committee’s note. 
 25. Id.  In other words, it does not eliminate the disparity in waiver outcomes that, 
before the adoption of Rule 502, was dependent upon the law of the jurisdiction where the 
action happens to reside. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(D). 
 28. See id.  As noted above, privilege review costs are particularly concerning when 
electronically stored information is in issue because of, among others, the volume of such 
data; the propensity for e-mail to be forwarded to many parties; the operation of computer 
programs that retain drafts, editorial comments, and deleted data; or metadata. 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note; see, e.g., J.C. Assocs. v. Fid. 
& Guar. Ins. Co., No. 01-2437(RJL/JMF), 2005 WL 1570140, at *2 (D.D.C. July 1, 2005) 
(where plaintiff sought claims files that defendant estimated might total 1.3 million, and 
plaintiff then focused on a geographic subset of 448, the magistrate judge proposed a quick-
peek and clawback protective order and gave defendant ten days to determine whether it 
would surrender the 428 files on this basis); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., 
 1594 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
However, while there may be sensible economic reasons to enter into 
such agreements, litigants still feared that the stipulation or court order 
precluding waiver was not applicable to third parties.  In addition, litigants 
continued to seek uniformity in the law in the case of inadvertent 
production, especially regarding the scope of the waiver with respect to 
information concerning the same subject matter as the inadvertently 
produced information.  Relief in both respects arrived in the form of Rule 
502. 
II.  FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502 
In May 2007, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
proposed Rule 502.30  It has two purposes:  (1) to resolve the disparate lines 
of authority on inadvertent waiver, and (2) to respond to subject matter 
waiver claims where, to reduce privilege review costs, a disclosure of 
privileged information (“however innocent or minimal”) has been made in a 
federal proceeding under a court order or to a federal agency.31  Rule 502 
had to be approved by the Congress before it could go into effect.32  On 
December 11, 2007, S. 2450 was introduced in the U.S. Senate to adopt 
Rule 502.33  The bill was passed by the Senate on February 27, 2008, 
approved by the House on September 8, 2008, and signed by the President 
on September 19, 2008.34  It became effective in all proceedings 
“commenced after the date of enactment” and “insofar as is just and 
practicable, in all proceedings pending” on the date of enactment.35 
 
No. 01 C 4366, 2003 WL 21911066, at *4 (N.D. Ill. August 7, 2003) (clawback procedure 
ordered). 
 30. For a thorough discussion of Rule 502’s origins and the initial case law interpreting 
the rule, see Paul W. Grimm Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter,, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 502:  Has It Lived Up to Its Potential?, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2011). 
 31. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note; see also JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE 
UNITED STATES, COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 3–4 (2007); Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Rosenthal Letter], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Hill_Letter_re_EV_502.pdf.  
 32. See Rosenthal Letter, supra note 31, at 1. 
 33. S. 2450 (110th): A Bill To Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence To Address the 
Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/110/s2450 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Pub. L. No. 110-322, § 1(c), 122 Stat. 3537, 3538 (2008) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. app.).  The explanatory note on Rule 502, prepared by the Advisory Committee on 
Evidence Rules, states that Rule 502 does not attempt “to alter federal or state law on 
whether a communication or information is protected under the attorney-client privilege or 
work product immunity as an initial matter.  Moreover, while establishing some exceptions 
to waiver, the rule does not purport to supplant applicable waiver doctrine generally.” FED. 
R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.  The explanatory note also states that common-law 
waiver doctrines still may be applicable where there is no disclosure of privileged 
information or work product. Id.  The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules cited to cases 
involving an advice-of-counsel defense, Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 
1999), and an allegation of lawyer malpractice, Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436 (D.D.C. 
1983). 
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Rule 502(a) provides that if a disclosure of privileged information is 
made in a federal proceeding or to a federal agency and “waives the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection,” the waiver extends to 
an “undisclosed” communication or information (i.e., so-called subject 
matter waiver) in a federal or state proceeding36 only if “(1) the waiver is 
intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or 
information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness 
to be considered together.”37  In other words, for an inadvertent disclosure, 
subject matter waiver cannot occur at all under Rule 502(a).38 
Rule 502(b) addresses disclosures generally in a federal proceeding or 
when made to a federal office or agency.39  The inadvertent disclosure does 
not operate as a waiver in a federal or a state40 proceeding if the holder of 
the privilege or work product protection “took reasonable steps to prevent 
[such a] disclosure”41 and the holder “promptly took reasonable steps to 
rectify the error,” including (if applicable) following Rule 26(b)(5)(B), as 
discussed above.42  This is a fact-specific inquiry to be made on a case-by-
 
 36. The reference to a state proceeding here is designed, according to the explanatory 
note to Rule 502(a), to assure “protection and predictability” in that the federal rule on 
subject matter waiver will govern “subsequent state court determinations on the scope of the 
waiver” by the disclosure. FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).  The explanatory note to Rule 502(a) borrowed the language 
“ought in fairness” from Federal Rule of Evidence 106:  “If a party introduces all or part of a 
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of 
any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be 
considered at the same time.” FED. R. EVID. 106.  The note explains that under both Rules, “a 
party that makes a selective, misleading presentation that is unfair to the adversary opens 
itself to a more complete and accurate presentation.” FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory 
committee’s note. 
 38. The explanatory note to Rule 502(a) specifically states:  “The rule rejects the result 
in In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which held that inadvertent disclosure 
of documents during discovery automatically constituted a subject matter waiver.” FED. R. 
EVID. 502(a) advisory committee’s note.  I do not dwell on Rule 502(a) in this Essay, but its 
value to litigants cannot be underestimated since a properly framed Rule 502(d) order should 
eliminate any concern regarding subject matter waiver. 
 39. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules recognized that the consequences of 
waiver and the related costs of pre-production privilege review can be just as great when 
disclosures are made “to offices and agencies as they are in litigation.” FED. R. EVID. 502(b) 
advisory committee’s note.  Hence, Rule 502(b) covers federal offices or agencies and 
includes those acting in the course of their “regulatory, investigative or enforcement 
authority.” Id.  Illustratively, EPA’s issuance of a Section 104(e) information request under 
the federal Superfund law, 42 U.S.C. § 9404(e) (2006), would be embraced by Rule 502(b). 
 40. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b), Rule 502 can only bind state courts if it is adopted by 
Congress. 
 41. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).  The explanatory note to Rule 502(b) states that the Advisory 
Committee on Evidence Rules “opt[ed] for the middle ground” of the three lines of authority 
on when inadvertent disclosure represents a waiver. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory 
committee’s note.  To put this statement in context, theretofore, courts reacted to inadvertent 
waiver of attorney-client privileged information and work product in three ways.  Some 
courts had held that inadvertent production of a privileged communication is an irretrievable 
waiver:  the First Circuit, District of Columbia Circuit, and the Federal Circuit adhered to 
this view. See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 & n.15 (D. Md. 2005).  Other 
courts held that unless the disclosure of the privileged information was intentional or there 
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case basis but demonstrates the value of promptly implementing Rule 
26(b)(5)(B) if it is applicable. 
The explanatory note provides guidance to courts and counsel on the 
application of new Rule 502(b) and, in particular, its flexibility in an era 
when the volume of documents is measured not by banker’s boxes but by 
gigabytes: 
 Cases such as Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 
F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 
109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985), set out a multifactor test for 
determining whether inadvertent disclosure is a waiver.  The stated factors 
(none of which is dispositive) are the reasonableness of precautions taken, 
the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of 
disclosure and the overriding issue of fairness.  The rule does not 
explicitly codify that test, because it is really a set of non-determinative 
guidelines that vary from case to case.  The rule is flexible enough to 
accommodate any of those listed factors. Other considerations bearing on 
the reasonableness of a producing party’s efforts include the number of 
documents to be reviewed and the time constraints for production. 
Depending on the circumstances, a party that uses advanced analytical 
software applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and 
work product may be found to have taken “reasonable steps” to prevent 
inadvertent disclosure.  The implementation of an efficient system of 
records management before litigation may also be relevant.43 
The explanatory note to Rule 502(b) adds that a producing party need not 
engage in post-production review to determine whether a protected 
communication or information has been accidentally produced.44  However, 
the note continues, a producing party is required “to follow up on any 
obvious indications that a protected communication or information has been 
produced inadvertently.”45 
Rule 502(c) addresses disclosures generally made in state proceedings 
where the disclosure is not the subject of a state-court order concerning 
waiver.  The disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal proceeding 
as long as the disclosure:  “(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it 
had been made in a federal proceeding; or (2) is not a waiver under the law 
of the State where the disclosure occurred.”46  The explanatory note to Rule 
502(c) states that the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee elected to have 
 
was gross negligence, there was no waiver.  The Eighth Circuit and a number of district 
courts adopted this approach. Id. at 235–36.  The remaining courts that addressed the topic 
took a middle ground.  They looked at the facts to determine the circumstances of the 
disclosure and they evaluated the reaction of the producing party to the discovery of the 
production.  Under prior case law, the more careless the production and the more dilatory the 
response to obtain return of privileged information, the more likely a court determined the 
privilege was waived. Id. at 236. 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. FED. R. EVID. 502(c). 
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courts “apply the law that is most protective of privilege and work 
product”47: 
If the state law is more protective (such as where the state law is that an 
inadvertent disclosure can never be a waiver), the holder of the privilege 
or protection may well have relied on that law when making the 
disclosure in the state proceeding.  Moreover, applying a more restrictive 
federal law or waiver could impair the state objective of preserving the 
privilege or work-product protection for disclosures made in state 
proceedings.  On the other hand, if the federal law is more protective, 
applying the state law of waiver to determine admissibility in federal 
court is likely to undermine the federal objective of limiting the costs of 
production.48 
Rule 502(c) specifically does not address the enforceability in a federal 
proceeding of a state-court order protecting the confidentiality of 
documents produced.  The explanatory note to Rule 502(c) said that it was 
unnecessary to do so because “a state court order finding no waiver in 
connection with a disclosure made in a state court proceeding is enforceable 
under existing law in subsequent federal proceedings.”49  In view of this 
statement, parties in state-court proceedings seeking disclosure protection 
unquestionably should obtain state-court confidentiality orders. 
I discuss Rule 502(d) in greater depth later, but for this descriptive 
narrative, Rule 502(d) addresses the binding effect of a federal district court 
order on nonwaiver.  It provides in full:  “A federal court may order that the 
privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the 
litigation pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is also 
not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.”50  This language 
gives force to a nonwaiver order approving a clawback procedure.  Party 
agreement is not necessary to enforce a 502(d) order, but any party agreeing 
to a clawback of privileged or protected documents or information will also 
want to have the court enter a 502(d) order. 
 
 47. Id. advisory committee’s note. 
 48. Id. 
 49. FED. R. EVID. 502(c).  The Evidence Rules Advisory Committee relied upon 28 
U.S.C. § 1738, which provides that state judicial proceedings “shall have the same full faith 
and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the 
courts of such State . . . from which they are taken,” and Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 
191 F.R.D. 495, 499 (D. Md. 2000), which the explanatory note characterizes as “noting that 
a federal court considering the enforceability of a state confidentiality order is ‘constrained 
by principles of comity, courtesy, and . . . federalism.’” FED. R. EVID. 502(c) advisory 
committee’s note. 
 50. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).  The explanatory note to Rule 502(d) states that this provision  
does not allow a federal court to enter an order determining the waiver effects of a 
separate disclosure of the same information in other proceedings, state or federal.  
If a disclosure has been made in a state proceeding (and is not the subject of a 
state-court order on waiver), then subdivision (d) is inapplicable.  Subdivision (c) 
would govern the federal court’s determination whether the state-court disclosure 
waived the privilege or protection in the federal proceeding.  
Id. advisory committee’s note. 
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Rule 502(e) requires that to be binding on third parties, agreements 
among parties on the effect of disclosure must be incorporated into a court 
order.51 
Rule 502(f) identifies the breadth of Rule 502’s protections and, in 
particular, with respect to state proceedings.  It provides in full: 
 Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101,52 this rule applies to State 
proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal court-mandated 
arbitration proceedings,53 in the circumstances set out in the rule.  And 
notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if state law provides the 
rule of decision.54 
The final subdivision of Rule 502, Rule 502(g),55 in subparagraph 
(1) defines attorney-client privilege as “the protection that applicable law 
provides for confidential attorney-client communications,” and in 
subparagraph (2) defines “work-product protection” as the protection “that 
applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”56 
Let me offer this illustration of the interplay of these various rules.  If a 
lawyer receives an inadvertently produced privileged document, under 
Model Rule 4.4(b), the lawyer should “promptly” notify the sender.  If the 
sender discovers the inadvertent production first in a federal proceeding, 
FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) should result in notice and resolution of the claim of 
waiver by the district court.  Rule 502(b) would then provide a uniform rule 
of law to determine if a waiver has occurred.  Parties that wish to address 
the potential of inadvertent production upfront should ask the district court 
 
 51. FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
 52. Rule 101 says that the Rules apply to proceedings in the courts of the United States 
to the extent and with the exceptions in Rule 1101.  Rule 1101 lists, among other things, the 
federal court jurisdictions in which the Rules of Evidence apply. See FED. R. EVID. 101; FED. 
R. EVID. 1101.  The explanatory note states that Rule 502(f) “is intended to resolve any 
potential tension between the provisions of Rule 502 that apply to state proceedings and the 
possible limitations on the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence otherwise provided 
by Rules 101 and 1101.” FED. R. EVID. 502(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 53. The explanatory note states that Rule 502(f) “is not intended to raise an inference 
about the applicability of any other rule of evidence in arbitration proceedings more 
generally.” FED. R. EVID. 502(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 54. FED. R. EVID. 502(f).  According to the explanatory note, “[t]he costs of discovery 
can be equally high for state and federal causes of action, and the rule seeks to limit those 
costs in all federal proceedings, regardless of whether the claim arises under state or federal 
law.  Accordingly, the rule applies to state law causes of action brought in federal court.” 
Id. advisory committee’s note. 
 55. The Advisory Committee considered an additional paragraph in Rule 502 on 
selective waiver—where a cooperating entity provides a government agency with privileged 
information without waiver as to third parties.  It was too controversial to include in Rule 
502, but the Advisory Committee provided draft language on selective waiver for Congress 
to consider. See JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 4.  Congress did 
not act on this proposal in adopting Rule 502. 
 56. FED. R. EVID. 502(g).  The explanatory note adds that the operation of waiver by 
disclosure as applied to other evidentiary privileges “remains a question of federal common 
law.” Id. 502(g) advisory committee’s note.  The rule also does not apply to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. 
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to enter a Rule 502(d) order to protect the parties from claims of privilege 
waiver by parties within the litigation or by third parties.  Under Rule 
502(a), only an intentional waiver can result in subject matter waiver if 
fairness dictates such an outcome and undisclosed information concerns the 
same subject matter.  Finally, parties are advised to obtain confidentiality 
orders in state court to best protect themselves from waiver claims in 
federal proceedings, although Rule 502(c) may still offer protection if its 
terms are satisfied.57 
With this background, let me more sharply juxtapose Rule 502(b) and 
Rule 502(d) by looking at decisions under each Rule.  Prudent litigators will 
quickly realize that there is no reason to put clients unnecessarily at risk of a 
claim of waiver or even of the need to expend resources and time to defend 
against a claim of waiver by eschewing a Rule 502(d) order.  They will also 
see that there is no client risk to utilizing a properly framed Rule 502(d) 
order, while there is considerable client risk in failing to have one. 
III.  RULE 502(B) DECISIONS:  INADVERTENCE IS IN THE EYES OF THE 
BEHOLDER—AND THAT’S TREACHEROUS 
The failure to have a Rule 502(d) order puts litigators in Model Rule 1.6 
jeopardy.  A discussion of just a few decisions demonstrates why thoughtful 
litigators will pay more attention to entry of Rule 502(d) orders. 
In Ceglia v. Zuckerberg,58 the plaintiff argued that a privileged email 
dated March 6, 2011, had been inadvertently produced and sought the 
return or destruction of the email and any copies of the email.59  In 
response, the defendant invoked Rule 502(b), arguing that the privilege had 
been waived.60 
Plaintiff’s counsel, Argentieri, was in California but needed a document 
from his computer in his office in Hornell, New York.61  So he retained an 
information technology expert, Flaitz, to recover the document, a PDF file 
labeled “Lawsuit Overview.”62  Flaitz was instructed to produce the file to 
defendants’ digital forensic consulting firm on December 16, 2011.63  The 
Lawsuit Overview file was an attachment to a March 6 email.64  Flaitz 
explained in a declaration that he inadvertently copied both the March 6 
email and the attachment and burned them onto a CD that he gave to 
Argentieri’s secretary who then, “[u]pon information and belief,” forwarded 
 
 57. The form of a state confidentiality order is not the subject of this Essay, but there is 
no reason why a state court confidentiality order could not include a statement that the order 
is intended, at least in part, to achieve the protection offered by Rule 502(a) with respect to 
subject matter waiver, as well as the full protection from waiver offered by Rule 502(d). 
 58. No. 10-CV-00569A(F), 2012 WL 1392965 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2012). 
 59. Id. at *2. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at *8. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at *7. 
 64. Id. 
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the CD to defendants’ consultant.65  Argentieri provided a declaration in 
which he stated he instructed Flaitz to copy only the attachment.66  Flaitz 
apparently did not contest that he was so instructed.67 
Defendants’ consultant, however, had received the Lawsuit Overview file 
and the March 6 email not by a CD, but by an email received on December 
16, 2011.68  This transmittal email had been originally sent from 
Argentieri’s Gmail account and was forwarded by Flaitz to defendants’ 
consultant, who added in his declaration that he never received a CD.69  
Defendants’ consultant also, on January 4, 2012, produced the transmittal 
email to all parties, effectively putting plaintiffs on notice of the production 
of the privileged email.70  Plaintiff’s first request to return or destroy the 
March 6 email was not made, however, until March 12, 2012, or more than 
two months later.71 
The magistrate judge identified the components of Rule 502(b)72 but then 
relied on pre–Rule 502 case law to establish the following test to evaluate 
waiver:  “The burden is on the party claiming a communication is 
privileged to demonstrate it ‘took reasonable steps to prevent’ any 
inadvertent disclosure, tried to remedy such disclosure immediately, and 
that the opposing party will not be unduly prejudiced by a protective 
order.”73  The plaintiff failed to meet this burden.  As to the reasonableness 
of the steps taken to prevent the inadvertent disclosure, the district court 
held that Argentieri erred by failing to have Flaitz forward to him first 
whatever documents Flaitz retrieved from the Hornell, New York office.74  
If the retrieval of documents from Argentieri’s computer was that 
important, the court held that Argentieri should have supervised it himself, 
also adding that Argentieri had not proffered any explanation why his 
presence in New York was not possible.75  Plaintiff also did not offer any 
explanation from Argentieri’s secretary regarding the CD Flaitz said he had 
burned.76 
As to the immediacy of remedial action, the magistrate judge observed 
that “generally” a producing party must request the return or destruction of 
 
 65. Id. at *8. 
 66. Id. at *7. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id.  There is no indication in the opinion that Rule 4.4 was the basis for the 
notice.  New York’s Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 4.4(b) is identical to Model Rule 
4.4(b). Compare N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012), with MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012). 
 71. Ceglia, 2012 WL 1392965, at *9. 
 72. Id. at *8 (“The privilege will not be waived if (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) 
the privilege holder took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the privilege holder 
took reasonable steps to rectify the error.”).  
 73. Id. at *8 (quoting Chapel Park Villa, Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-407F, 
2006 WL 2827867, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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inadvertently produced privileged documents “within days after learning of 
the disclosure.”77  The plaintiff’s delay until March 12, 2012, more than 
two months later, was too long, the court held.78 
The magistrate judge then added that the plaintiff failed to meet its 
burden of showing that the defendants would not suffer prejudice if no 
waiver was found:  “Plaintiff has utterly failed to offer any explanation 
demonstrating that protecting belated protection of the March 6, 2011 email 
will not be unduly prejudicial to Defendants.”79 
Inhalation Plastics, Inc. v. MedexCardio Pulmonary Inc.,80 involved the 
inadvertent production of less than 347 pages of privileged documents out 
of a production of 85,000 pages of documents that occurred in phases.81  A 
May 30, 2011 production was in issue.82  IPI successfully demonstrated that 
Medex had waived the privilege.83 
The magistrate judge began the waiver analysis by quoting the text from 
Rule 502(b) but then identified the following five factors for consideration 
in a waiver determination:  “(1) the reasonableness of precautions taken in 
view of the extent of document production, (2) the number of inadvertent 
disclosures, (3) the magnitude of the disclosure, (4) any measures taken to 
mitigate the damage of the disclosures, and (5) the overriding interests of 
justice.”84  The court recognized that this multifactor test is not a mandatory 
test under Rule 502(b), but instead “serves to guide a court’s analysis when 
appropriate under the particular circumstances of each case.”85  
Nonetheless, the court proceeded to evaluate each factor. 
As to the reasonableness of the steps taken to prevent the disclosure of 
privileged documents, Medex told the court that there were several levels of 
review by attorneys, who “isolated the privileged documents.”86  The 
magistrate judge was not persuaded.  The court explained that Medex did 
 
 77. Id. at *9; see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., Nos. 
97Civ.6124 (JGK)(THK), 98Civ.3099 (JGK)(THK), 2000 WL 744369, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 
8, 2000) (one-day delay in making request represented prompt action); Aramony v. United 
Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. GAF 
Roofing Mfg. Co., No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP), 1995 WL 117871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 
1995) (two-day delay was timely). 
 78. See Ceglia, 2012 WL 1392965, at *9. 
 79. Id.  It is not clear what the court meant by this statement.  The email had identified a 
person, Holmberg, who prepared the Lawsuit Overview.  That was significant because the 
court had earlier required the plaintiff to identify every person who had possession of the 
Lawsuit Overview.  Holmberg had not been identified.  If this was the basis of the prejudice, 
however, it was not explained why the defendants were “unduly prejudiced” by the failure to 
identify Holmberg earlier. 
 80. No. 2:07-CV-116, 2012 WL 3731483 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2012). 
 81. Medex sought privilege status for 347 pages of documents. Id. at *2–3.  The 
magistrate judge determined that only some of the documents were privileged. Id. 
 82. Id. at *1. 
 83. Id. at *6. 
 84. Id. at *3 (quoting Evenflo Co. v. Hantec Agents Ltd., No. 3-:05-CV-346, 2006 WL 
2945440, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2006)).  
 85. Id. (quoting N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc., v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-
101, 2010 WL 1873291, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 2010)). 
 86. Id. at *4. 
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not specify who reviewed the production in question, the steps taken to 
review the documents for privilege, and whether the May 30, 2011 
production was different from prior productions.87  It also did not produce a 
privilege log despite the fact that its declarations stated that “several layers 
of attorneys” had “isolated” privileged documents.88  This misfeasance 
amounted to a failure to establish that reasonable precautions were taken to 
prevent an inadvertent disclosure.89 
The May 30, 2011 production consisted of 7,500 pages.90  Thus, the 347 
pages claimed to be privileged represented 4.6 percent of this production.91  
Once again, the declaration that several layers of attorneys reviewed this 
production came back to haunt Medex.92  The court observed that this was a 
high percentage of privileged documents given this assertion by Medex.93 
What is meant by the third of the court’s factors:  the “magnitude of 
disclosure”?  Again emphasizing Medex’s assertion that several layers of 
attorneys reviewed the production, the court explained why the magnitude 
of the disclosure was high: 
 The documents disclosed in the May 30 production were essentially 
complete documents consisting of legal memoranda, emails and email 
attachments.  The number of privileged documents that were disclosed 
was significant, those documents were not marked as confidential and no 
privilege log was provided with the disclosed documents.  More 
importantly, the documents appear to be relevant to IPI’s claims and IPI 
has attempted to use them in depositions.  These considerations all 
suggest that the magnitude of the disclosure was high.94 
In Rule 502(b) terms, Medex had acted quickly to rectify the disclosure.  It 
learned of the disclosure when IPI sought to use the documents in 
depositions.95  It immediately demanded return of the documents.96  Yet, 
adding another gloss to Rule 502, the magistrate judge faulted Medex for 
failing to follow FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), which, the court said, required that 
Medex give notice to IPI, identify the privileged information, and state the 
basis for the claim of privilege.97  Instead, Medex gave IPI notice that it 
intended to assert a claim of privilege, and that the documents “might 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.; see also Evenflo Co. v. Hantec Agents Ltd., No. 3-:05-CV-346, 2006 WL 
2945440, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2006) (134 pages out of 10,085 pages resulted in a 
waiver); Dyson v. Amway Corp., No. G88-CV-60, 1990 WL 290683, at *3 (W.D. Mich. 
Nov. 15, 1990) (93 documents out of 15,000 documents resulted in a waiver). 
 94. Inhalation Plastics, 2012 WL 3731483, at *4. 
 95. Id. at *1.  There was no discussion in the opinion of Ohio RPC 4.4(b), which reads 
the same as Model Rule 4.4(b). Compare OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012), 
with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012). 
 96. Inhalation Plastics, 2012 WL 3731483, at *5. 
 97. Id. 
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contain” privileged communications that were inadvertently produced.98  It 
failed to identify any documents that were privileged and, as the court had 
repeatedly noted, had failed to generate a privilege log.99  Medex also failed 
to state “a basis for the claimed privilege.”100  The court noted that 
“[c]onsideration of Medex’s inaction and failure to comply with Rule 26 
leads to the conclusion that Medex failed to take adequate measures to 
rectify or mitigate the damage of the disclosures.”101 
Finally, much like the “undue prejudice” factor in Ceglia, the court held 
that the “interests of justice” factor favored IPI, because:  (1) Medex did not 
specify a particular document that it claimed was privileged; (2) had not 
produced a privilege log; and (3) did not comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(B).102  
On the other hand, IPI relied on the disclosures as evidenced by the “extent 
of the disclosure” and the “relevance of the information disclosed,” as well 
as IPI’s attempt to use the disclosures in depositions of three individuals.103  
The court concluded that “[t]hese factors, combined with Medex’s 
relatively weak response in its attempts to rectify the claimed inadvertent 
disclosure, suggest that the interests of justice militate in favor of IPI.”104 
The court in Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Village of Park Forest105 
also found a waiver.  The discovery process at issue involved a keyword 
search for documents on backup tapes by the defendant.106  The village’s 
vendor, Kroll, placed the documents retrieved in an online database 
accessible only to counsel for the village, who then reviewed them for 
responsiveness and privilege.107  The village said that its attorney reviewers 
labeled every document in the database as responsive, nonresponsive, or 
privileged.108  On a rolling basis, Kroll then placed responsive documents 
into a database available to plaintiff’s counsel.109  To assuage plaintiff’s 
concerns about the village’s decisions, the database was structured to allow 
plaintiff’s counsel to see documents that had been marked as 
nonresponsive.110 
Production then occurred over a seven-month period through October 
2009.111  Within this time frame, the village did not produce a privilege log 
and its counsel told plaintiff’s counsel that it was not withholding any 
documents.112  At a December 10, 2009 deposition, plaintiff sought to use 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Nos. 08 C 1225, 08-C-0869, 08-C-4303, 2011 WL 3489828 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011). 
 106. Id. at *1. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *2. 
 110. Id. at *1. 
 111. Id. at *2. 
 112. Id. 
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two documents that the village immediately claimed were privileged.113  
Four months later, on April 26, 2010, the village produced a privilege log 
listing 159 documents that the village had marked as “privileged” during its 
review but had been inadvertently placed into the production database 
available to plaintiff.114  Several meet-and-confer sessions reduced the 
number of privilege claims to six documents, the focus of plaintiff’s waiver 
motion.115 
The magistrate judge first determined that parts of the six documents 
contained privileged information.116  It then applied Rule 502(b) to 
determine whether waiver had occurred. 
The court eschewed multifactor analyses to determine inadvertence.  The 
magistrate judge explained that prior to the adoption of Rule 502(b), courts 
looked to “the extent of discovery and the level of care exercised during 
pre-production review to determine whether a disclosure was 
inadvertent.”117  After the passage of Rule 502(b), courts in the Northern 
District of Illinois, at least, had “largely abandoned” the multifactored test 
and instead asked the question of whether the producing party “intended a 
privileged or work-product protected document to be produced or whether 
the production was a mistake.”118 
The second half of this disjunctive statement is what should control, 
since a lawyer should never intend to produce a privileged document except 
in rare circumstances.  Nonetheless, the court sought to discern the village’s 
intent.  Favoring the village, the court credited the statement in the village’s 
filing that its counsel was under the impression that documents that had 
been marked “privileged” would be withheld from the production 
database.119  It also recognized that the village objected at the deposition to 
the use of the privileged documents, saying then they had been 
inadvertently produced and following up with plaintiff’s counsel after the 
deposition to make the same point.120  Disfavoring the village was the fact 
that, during the rolling production, its counsel had told plaintiff’s counsel 
three different times that no documents were being withheld, and a privilege 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *4–5. 
 117. Id. at *5; see also Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 
529 F.3d 371, 388 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 118. Id. (quoting Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 
1038 (N.D. Ill. 2009)); see also Sidney I. v. Focused Retail Prop. I, LLC, 274 F.R.D. 212, 
216 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No. 09 C 3607, 2010 WL 4512337, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010).  The magistrate judge added that this analysis is preferred “because 
the drafters’ choice to separate inadvertent disclosure from subparts (b)(2) and (b)(3) 
suggests that they did not intend for courts to repeatedly consider the same facts at each step 
of Rule 502(b).” Thorncreek Apts. III, 2011 WL 3489828, at *5 (citing Coburn, 640 F. Supp. 
2d at 1038). 
 119. Thorncreek Apts. III, 2011 WL 3489828, at *6. 
 120. Id. 
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log was never generated giving credence to that representation.121  On 
balance, the magistrate judge decided that the production was 
inadvertent.122 
The court recognized that the advisory committee note to Rule 502(b) 
states that Rule 502(b) does not “explicitly” codify the multifactor test used 
in prior case law123 to determine whether a producing party took reasonable 
steps to prevent disclosure.  The court, however, relied on the multifactor 
test because the note also states that Rule 502(b) is “flexible enough to 
accommodate any of those listed factors.”124 
The village did not provide the court with much to rely on to save the 
village from waiver.  The village’s counsel said he “spent countless hours 
reviewing” documents and labeled privileged documents in the Kroll 
database, but the village itself never provided any sworn testimony 
regarding the review process, which the court regarded as significant.125  
The magistrate judge was also unimpressed by the lack of discipline in the 
privilege review when the “most the Village can say is that it ‘thought’ that 
marking a document as ‘privileged’” would cause Kroll to segregate the 
privileged documents.126  Not surprisingly, the court pointed out that it 
would have been very simple for the village to check the production 
database to verify that privileged documents had not been included.127  The 
court was impressed by another fact, however:  the “abject failure” of the 
village’s process to protect any of its claimed privileged documents.128 
While the volume of documents—250,000—was large, the village took 
six months to produce them, meaning that, on these facts, time trumped 
volume.  Time was not, however, the village’s friend when it came to 
evaluating the steps taken to rectify the inadvertent disclosure.  While the 
 
 121. Id. at *2, *6. 
 122. Id. at *6 (“However, we are not persuaded by this evidence that the Village intended 
to produce these documents.  There is no evidence that the Village sought to use these 
documents affirmatively—or even knew they had been produced until plaintiffs sought to 
use two of them at the Mick deposition.  And, when plaintiffs sought to use these documents, 
the Village’s counsel immediately objected.  That conduct is inconsistent with an intentional 
production.  On balance, therefore, we are persuaded that the production was inadvertent.”). 
 123. Id.  These are the same factors used in Innovation Plastics, which the court in 
Thorncreek summarized as “the reasonableness of precautions taken, the time taken to 
rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of disclosure, and the overriding issue of 
fairness . . . .” Id. 
 124. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 125. Id. at *7.  The court compared Coburn and Kmart. Compare Coburn Grp., LLC v. 
Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1034–38 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding an 
affidavit outlining a six-step review process sufficient to deny waiver), with Kmart Corp. v. 
Footstar, Inc., No. 09 C 3607, 2010 WL 4512337, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010) (holding that 
an affidavit from counsel stating that he personally reviewed documents with an eye toward 
identifying any privilege issues was an inadequate description without any further facts).  
 126. Thorncreek Apts. III, 2011 WL 3489828, at *7. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  The court cited Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 117 
(N.D. Ill. 1996), in which the court held that it is “axiomatic that a screening procedure that 
fails to detect confidential documents that are actually listed as privileged is patently 
inadequate.” 
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court acknowledged that the village reacted immediately when it learned of 
the disclosures at a deposition, and while the court chose not to penalize the 
village for the delay in producing a privilege log, the court could not 
overlook the failure of the village to figure out between March 2009—when 
production commenced—and the deposition in December 2009—when the 
village learned of the disclosures—that it had produced every one of its 
privileged documents.129  The magistrate judge then evaluated “fairness,” 
giving the nod to the plaintiff because it had already used two of the 
documents in a deposition.130 
The final case I have chosen in this illustrative tour is Rhoads Industries, 
Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of America.131  Rhoads highlights the role 
of a privilege log in the waiver analysis but from a different perspective 
than in Inhalation Plastics and Thorncreek Apts.  It also highlights how the 
“interests of justice” differ from “overriding interests of fairness” or “undue 
prejudice” in a multifactor analysis of waiver. 
In Rhoads, the plaintiff engaged consultants in early 2008 to conduct a 
thorough keyword search of ESI.132  The consultants designated 2,000 
emails as privileged.133  They were removed from electronic folders that 
were ultimately produced to the defendants, but they were not recorded on a 
privilege log.134  The plaintiffs refined the keyword search to attempt to 
reduce the number of responsive documents, conducted a review of the 
resulting ESI, and generated a privilege log of privileged documents within 
this batch of ESI before it was produced to the defendants.135 
 
 129. Id. at *8.  After pointing out that the production began in March 2009, that the 
village’s counsel expected privileged documents to be excluded, that plaintiff was accessing 
the database and extracting documents for production, the court observed:   
Yet, for some nine months, the Village apparently had no inkling that the 
production database contained documents that the Village wished to withhold as 
privileged, or that Thorncreek was reviewing and obtaining those documents.  If 
that is true (and we accept that it is), that means the Village was not paying any 
attention whatsoever to what documents its opponent in the litigation was 
selecting from the database.  Perhaps Thorncreek simply selected all of them; the 
parties’ briefs do not tell us if this is so. But, even if that were the case, a single 
visit to the production database could have alerted the Village to the problem.” 
 Id. 
 130. Id.  There was no reference to Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4 in the 
opinion.  Illinois’s RPC 4.4(b) reads:  “A lawyer who receives a document relating to the 
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows that the document was inadvertently sent 
shall promptly notify the sender.” ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010).  Given 
the absence of a privilege log and the village’s representation that it was not withholding any 
documents, perhaps the lawyer did not know the two documents were privileged.  It is 
difficult to discern from the court’s analysis whether any of the village’s six documents 
claimed to be privileged were, in fact, privileged, and whether the deposition exhibits were 
among them. 
 131. 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 132. Id. at 222. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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On June 5, 2008, the defendants identified documents within this 
production that appeared to be privileged and gave notice to the 
plaintiffs.136  Plaintiff’s counsel responded immediately that the production 
of privileged information had been inadvertent.137  By June 30, 2008, the 
plaintiff produced a new privilege log adding 812 documents and requested 
that the defendant sequester the inadvertently produced documents.138  The 
defendant then moved to have the court determine that the privilege had 
been waived.139 
In a subsequent hearing, counsel for the plaintiff admitted that the 2,000 
emails originally identified as privileged by plaintiff’s consultant had not 
been identified on a privilege log because they believed that these 
documents would have been captured on the June 6 log.  That misfeasance 
was remedied on November 12, 2008, when the plaintiff produced another 
privilege log.140  Of the 2,000 emails, after duplicates and nonresponsive 
documents were removed, 120 of them were responsive but privileged, and 
had not been logged on prior privilege logs.141 
Under FRCP 26(b)(5)(A), a party that withholds discoverable 
information because it is privileged must generate a privilege log.142  
Failure to do so may amount to a waiver.143  The district court first 
determined that Rule 502(b) played no role in the determination of waiver 
as to the documents on the November 12, 2008 privilege log.  The delay 
between June 30, 2008, and November 12, 2008, was too long to be 
excused, the court held, and thus, under FRCP 26(b)(5)(A), the privilege 
was lost as to documents logged for the first time on that date.144 
 
 136. Id. There was no indication in the opinion that Pennsylvania RPC 4.4, which is 
identical to Model Rule 4.4, was the basis for the notice. Compare PA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012). 
 137. Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 222. 
 138. Id. at 222–23. 
 139. Id. at 223. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Rule 26(b)(5)(A) provides:   
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the 
information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the 
party must:  (i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the 
documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and 
do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or 
protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A). 
 143. Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 221 (quoting Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar 
Ass’n, 914 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).  The district court in Rhoads laid out time 
contours:  a delay of two months after production to produce a privilege log resulted in a 
waiver, see Get-A-Grip, II, Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. CIV.A. 99-1332, 2000 WL 
1201385, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. 2000); while a delay of four days after the original production 
was timely, see In re Total Containment, Inc., No. 04-13144BIF, 2007 WL 1775364, at *8 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007). Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 221. 
 144. Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 226 (“Despite Rhoads’s attempts to justify, explain and 
minimize its failure to log all of its inadvertently privileged documents by June 30, 2008, the 
Court finds that the delay in doing so until November 12, 2008 is too long and inexcusable. 
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As to the Rule 502(b) waiver analysis, the district court first determined 
that the plaintiff had “minimally complied” with the three factors stated in 
Rule 502(b) but that “reasonableness” was in dispute.145  To evaluate 
reasonableness, the court applied the “traditional five-factor test” articulated 
in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. McCulloch146: 
 (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent 
disclosure in view of the extent of the document production; 
 (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; 
 (3) the extent of the disclosure; 
 (4) any delay and measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and 
 (5) whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not be 
served by relieving the party of its errors.147 
On the facts, the district court concluded that the first four factors favored 
the defendant, but that the interests of justice favored the plaintiff:   
Loss of the attorney-client privilege in a high-stakes, hard-fought 
litigation is a severe sanction and can lead to serious prejudice.  Although 
I have little knowledge of the content of Rhoads’s privileged documents, I 
assume they contain candid assessments of the facts and strategy in this 
case, as to which Rhoads understandably has a high degree of proprietary 
interest.148   
The district court added that the defendants would not be prejudiced 
because they had no “right or expectation to any of” plaintiff’s privileged 
communications.149 
These cases demonstrate why thoughtful lawyers will never want to rely 
on Rule 502(b) for protection against inadvertent disclosure.  In Ceglia, the 
court had already decided that the plaintiff did not act reasonably in 
producing the document or in trying to retrieve it.  Why add prejudice into 
the equation?  Suppose the plaintiff had failed to take reasonable steps to 
prevent the production but acted immediately to try to retrieve it.  Or 
suppose plaintiff had taken reasonable steps and acted immediately to 
retrieve it.  Would prejudice matter in either case?  When does prejudice 
 
This conclusion does not entail any analysis of F.R.E. 502, because of the clear mandate of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5).”). 
 145. Id. at 226. 
 146. 168 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 147. Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 226. 
 148. Id. at 226–27. 
 149. Id. at 227.  The court explained in full:   
On the other hand, denying these documents to Defendants is not prejudicial to 
Defendants because, in the first place, they have no right or expectation to any of 
Rhoads’s privileged communications, and further, because of my ruling on the 
privileged documents not logged by June 30, 2008, the Defendants will receive a 
significant number of privileged documents.  Furthermore, there has been 
abundant discovery on the merits of this case, and expert depositions await 
completion. 
Id. 
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become “undue”?  And what of the rights of the holder of the privilege?  
The text of Rule 502(b) does not mention the concept of prejudice; it 
focuses only on whether the disclosure was, in fact, inadvertent and the 
reasonableness of the steps taken to prevent the disclosure and rectify the 
error.  A recipient of inadvertently produced privileged information that the 
producing party is trying to retrieve is likely always going to be prejudiced 
by the inability to use it. 
Inhalation Plastics suggests that a recipient of inadvertently produced 
documents can improve its argument in support of waiver by trying to use 
the documents and then arguing the interests of fairness favor waiver 
because of the relevance of the privileged documents and an attempt to use 
them in discovery.  It also introduces compliance with Rule 26(b)(5)(B) 
into the determination of the reasonableness of the steps taken to rectify an 
inadvertent disclosure. 
Thorncreek cabins the use of multifactor tests to determine if the 
production of a privileged document was a mistake but minimizes the role 
that the volume of documents plays if a producing party spreads the 
production over a relatively long period of time—in effect suggesting that 
the inadvertent disclosure should have been discovered.  It also paid no 
heed to the recipient’s Model Rule 4.4 duty to put the producing party on 
notice that it had received privileged documents. 
Rhoads points out the hazard of trying to satisfy Rule 502(b) when there 
is no protective order and a party is aware of privileged documents but fails 
to include them on a privilege log that was generated.  It also points out the 
variability in judicial reactions to the application of “interests of justice,” 
“fairness,” or “prejudice.” 
Had a thoughtfully constructed Rule 502(d) order been entered, the 
producing parties in all of these cases could have avoided a Rule 502(b) 
analysis, and waiver would have been determined under the terms of the 
order, or not at all, if the order anticipated that privileged documents might 
be produced which, after all, is the purpose behind Rule 502(d). 
IV.  RULE 502(D) ORDERS:  WISE LAWYERS WILL WELCOME THEM 
Properly framed Rule 502(d) orders will change the focus of inadvertent 
production from the question of waiver to the question of privilege.  But 
before we get to framing, let me paint the case law picture because it is an 
intricate one. 
Alcon Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.150 was a patent lawsuit 
involving one document, referred to as Exhibit 71 in the opinion.  Exhibit 
71 was a publication release form relating to the publication for a scientific 
article regarding an ophthalmic solution that was at issue in the litigation.151  
There were handwritten notes of an attorney on the document, which was 
 
 150. No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 5070465 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008). 
 151. Id. at *1. 
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part of an electronic production made by plaintiffs.152  On January 29, 
2008, one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses was deposed.153  The exhibit was 
marked and shown to the witness who testified that she did not recognize it 
or the handwriting on the exhibit.154  Counsel for the defendants moved on 
to the next exhibit.155  Counsel for the plaintiffs made no objection at the 
time.156 
On February 6, 2008, counsel for the defendants deposed an in-house 
counsel of the plaintiff Alcon.157  Exhibit 71 was shown to the witness who 
then explained that the handwriting at the top of the page was that of an in-
house intellectual property lawyer.158  After an eight-minute break, counsel 
for the defendants asked a question about the handwriting in the middle of 
the page.159  Counsel for the plaintiffs then indicated that the writing may 
be privileged and moved to strike the notation on the exhibit.160  Plaintiffs’ 
counsel did not, at this time, identify the handwriting at the top of the 
document as privileged.161 
The plaintiffs then determined that Exhibit 71 had been listed on its 
privilege log because of notes written on the document but that it had been 
inadvertently produced because of an electronic document break error.162  
On February 11, 2008, the plaintiffs provided the defendants with a 
redacted version of the document and asked the defendants to destroy all 
copies of the documents containing any handwritten notations.163  The 
defendants ignored the request and showed the document to one of its 
expert witnesses who relied on the document in rendering an expert 
report.164 
There was no dispute that the unredacted version of Exhibit 71 was 
privileged.165  But the defendant argued that under Rule 502(b), the 
privilege had been waived.166  A prescient pre-502(d) protective order 
rescued the plaintiff and changed the inquiry from waiver under 502(d) to 
compliance with the order.167  Paragraph 20 of the order provided that as 
long as the producing party made a good-faith representation that an 
inadvertent production was a mistake and took prompt remedial action to 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at *2. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  The opinion does not explain this term, but presumably there was a computer-
generated list of documents being produced for lawyer review, and the privileged document 
was not included because of a break in the electronic document listing. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at *3. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at *4. 
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withdraw the disclosure upon discovery, the recipient had to return the 
document and destroy all copies and summaries or notes relating to the 
document, and could not make a waiver claim.168  Here is the text of 
Paragraph 20: 
 If a producing party inadvertently or mistakenly produces information, 
documents or tangible items in this Action that should have been withheld 
subject to a claim of attorney-client privilege or work product immunity, 
such production shall not prejudice such claim or otherwise constitute a 
waiver of any claim of attorney-client privilege or work product immunity 
for such information, provided that the producing party promptly makes a 
good-faith representation that such production was inadvertent or 
mistaken and takes prompt remedial action to withdraw the disclosure 
upon its discovery.  Within three (3) business days of receiving a written 
request to do so from the producing party, the receiving party shall return 
to the producing party any documents or tangible items that the producing 
party represents are covered by a claim of attorney-client privilege or 
work product immunity and were inadvertently or mistakenly produced.  
The receiving party shall also destroy all copies or summaries of, or notes 
relating to, any such inadvertently or mistakenly produced information; 
provided, however, that this Order shall not preclude the party returning 
such information from making a motion to compel production of the 
returned information on a basis other than a waiver because of its 
inadvertent production as part of a discovery production under this 
protective order.  The producing party shall retain copies of all returned 
documents and tangible items for further disposition.169 
The magistrate judge looked literally at compliance with the terms of the 
order.  The plaintiffs made a good-faith representation.170  They told the 
defendants at the second deposition that the disclosure was inadvertent.171  
Five days later, they wrote the defendants a letter stating that the production 
was inadvertent.172  Bolstering plaintiffs’ good faith, the court noted that 
Exhibit 71 had been placed on a privilege log and was produced only 
because of an electronic break error.173  The defendants also acknowledged 
that they had no evidence to dispute the inadvertence of the production.174 
The court also regarded the plaintiffs as in compliance with the order’s 
requirement that the producing party take prompt remedial measures to 
withdraw the disclosure.  While plaintiffs’ counsel did not immediately 
assert a privilege at the first deposition, and did not specifically object to 
the use of the handwriting until several days after the second deposition, the 
court remained comfortable that the protective order’s requirements had 
been met: 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at *5. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at *4. 
 174. Id. 
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[T]he handwriting on the privileged document—particularly the notation 
at the top of the sheet including the signature—is difficult to read. The 
handwriting at the top of the page is also rather similar to the handwriting 
in the center of the page, so on first glance both writings could easily be 
attributed to the same author.  Failure by the attorney creating the 
privilege log to immediately recognize the handwriting at the top of the 
page as that of a different attorney is understandable.  Likewise, the 
several-day delay Plaintiffs took after the Ryan deposition to review the 
document against its records, decipher the handwriting, and ascertain all 
communicators involved does not indicate a lack of prompt remedial 
action by Plaintiffs.175 
The court bolstered its views by invoking as one of the main purposes of 
Rule 502 the potential reduction in litigation costs: 
 Concluding otherwise would undermine one of the main purposes of 
new Evidence Rule 502, which codifies the primary purpose of provisions 
such as ¶ 20 of the protective order in this case:  to address the 
“widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against 
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have become 
prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however innocent or 
minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver of all protected 
communications or information” which is “especially troubling in 
electronic discovery.”  Perhaps the situation at hand could have been 
avoided had Plaintiffs’ counsel meticulously double or triple-checked all 
disclosures against the privilege log prior to any disclosures.  However, 
this type of expensive, painstaking review is precisely what new Evidence 
Rule 502 and the protective order in this case were designed to avoid.176 
The order in Alcon superseded Rule 502(b).  In contrast, the order in 
United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc.177 made allowance for the application 
of Rule 502(b); thus, a waiver resulted. 
In Sensient Colors, over a six-day period, the United States had produced 
45,000 documents representing 135,000 pages in 450 boxes.178 On August 
29, 2008, the defendant returned eighty-one documents it thought might be 
privileged.179  By letter dated September 10, 2008, the plaintiff confirmed 
that eighty of the eighty-one documents were privileged and inadvertently 
produced.180  However, the United States took no other actions to reassess 
its production.181 
On October 23, 2008, the defendant returned another eighty-nine 
documents as privileged.182  On November 21, 2008, the plaintiff produced 
a supplemental privilege log that listed most of the returned documents.183  
 
 175. Id. at *6 (citation omitted). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Civ. No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). 
 178. Id. at *1. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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On March 18, 2009, the plaintiff identified another document as privileged 
that had been produced.184  After acquiring new software, the plaintiff 
reviewed its document database and determined that ninety-one more 
privileged documents had been inadvertently produced.185  It identified six 
more such documents on August 6, 2009.186  Finally, on August 7, 2009, 
the plaintiff advised the court that its privilege review process was 
completed and, in the end, 214 privileged documents had been produced 
inadvertently.187 
Claiming waiver, the defendant moved to compel production of the 
privileged documents.  The United States argued that the parties’ discovery 
plan precluded a privilege waiver.188  Unfortunately, that document did not 
state that the parties were excused from Rule 502(b).189  Paragraph VI of 
the discovery plan provided:  “The Parties agree that the inadvertent 
production of privileged documents or information (including ESI) shall 
not, in and of itself, waive any privilege that would otherwise attach to the 
document or information produced.”190  The magistrate judge construed this 
language to mean that an inadvertent production was not an automatic 
waiver but that a waiver claim could still be made: 
The most sensible construction of the parties’ Discovery Plan is that the 
inadvertent production of a document “in and of itself” does not waive a 
privilege. In other words, the parties agreed not to subject themselves to 
the harsh rule that a mere inadvertent production results in a waiver.  The 
Court agrees with defendant that the parties intended to incorporate the 
“flexible” standard to determine if a waiver occurred.191 
The court added that the parties were represented by sophisticated counsel, 
and had they wanted to permit a clawback of privileged documents 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at *1–2. 
 188. Id. at *2. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at *2 n.4. 
 191. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).  The court agreed with the statement in Koch Materials 
Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109 (D.N.J. 2002), that courts generally frown 
upon broad “blanket” disclosure provisions because they immunize attorneys from 
“negligent handling of documents, could lead to sloppy attorney review and improper 
disclosure which could jeopardize clients’ cases.” Koch Materials, 208 F.R.D. at 118.  The 
“blanket provision” in Koch Materials was a letter agreement between counsel in which they 
agreed that documents that contained handwritten comments would not become the subject 
of a waiver argument. Id.  The recipient of the privileged documents argued that the 
agreement applied only to a subset of the production and not to all documents produced and 
that, therefore, on the facts, a waiver had occurred. Id.  This debate prompted the district 
court to say that where the “interpretation of the provision remains hotly disputed, as it is in 
this case, broad construction is ill advised.” Id.  The court then performed a substantive 
waiver analysis. Id. at 118–21.  A 502(d) order is entered by the district court purposefully to 
protect the privileged materials from waiver due to inadvertent or even advertent disclosure 
in order to reduce the review costs associated with production of electronically stored 
information and minimize disputes unrelated to the merits. 
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inadvertently produced, they would have so stated.192  The court then 
proceeded to conduct a 502(b) waiver analysis substituting for the terms of 
502(b) the five-factor test from Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd.193  The 
court upheld the privilege as to documents returned by the defendant as 
potentially privileged on August 29, 2008, but deemed the privilege waived 
for all inadvertently produced documents identified after that date because 
of the United States’ failure to take “prompt and diligent steps to re-assess 
its document production” after it was put on notice of a problem by the 
August 29, 2008 letter.194 
U.S. Home Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC195 provides another example 
of a protective order framed, in hindsight, to trigger, instead of avoid, Rule 
 
 192. Sensient Colors, 2009 WL 2905474, at *2. 
 193. Id. at *3; see Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411 (D.N.J. 1995).  
The test is as follows:   
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in 
view of the document production, (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures, (3) 
the extent of the disclosures, (4) any delay and measures taken to rectify the 
disclosure, and (5) whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not 
be served by relieving the party of its error.  
Sensient Colors, 2009 WL 2905474, at *3 (citing Ciba Geigy, 916 F. Supp. at 411).  The 
magistrate judge felt that the advisory committee note to Rule 502(b) allowed the court to 
utilize these factors. Id. at 3 n.8 (“The rule . . . is really a set of non-determinative guidelines 
that vary from case to case” and is designed to be “flexible.”).  In Ciba Geigy, the district 
court rejected a “blanket” inadvertent disclosure clause that was advocated by the plaintiff 
and “insisted that any such provision would not excuse the parties from conducting a 
privilege review prior to the production of documents, in accordance with controlling case 
law.” Ciba Geigy, 916 F. Supp. at 406.  In 1996, this may have been a sensible ruling.  
Today, courts are doing just the opposite:  offering protective orders to prevent a producing 
party from having to incur the enormous costs of privilege review. See, e.g., US Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. PHL Variable Ins. Co., No. 12 Civ. 6811(CM)(JCF), 2012 WL 5395249 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 5, 2012); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432–33 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (where, as a cost-saving measure, the magistrate judge proposed a clawback 
procedure so that the privilege could be asserted by the responding party after production 
and review of electronic documents by the requesting party).  U.S. Bank National Ass’n 
involved a motion to quash subpoenas issued by the plaintiff and objected to by two 
nonparty insurance companies. US Bank Nat’l. Ass’n, 2012 WL 5395249, at *2.  The 
information sought was only marginally relevant, which apart from Rule 45’s requirement to 
protect the subpoena recipient from undue expense, prompted the court to require US Bank 
to bear the search, collection, and production costs associated with the subpoenas. Id. at *3–
4.  The magistrate judge was unwilling, however, to shift privilege review costs to the 
subpoena-issuer. Id. at *4.  To ameliorate this conclusion, the court entered an order under 
Rule 502(d) to protect the nonparties from a privilege waiver leaving it up to the nonparties 
then to decide whether they wished to do a privilege review first at their expense:  “Although 
Transamerica and SCOR are, of course, free to engage in as exacting a privilege review as 
they wish, entry of a Rule 502(d) order will give them the option of conducting a more 
economical analysis while minimizing the risk of waiver.” Id. at *4. 
 194. Sensient Colors, 2009 WL 2905474, at *6.  This failure triggered Rule 502(b)(3)’s 
application, and in support of its decision, the court relied on the advisory committee’s note 
to Rule 502(b)(3):  “The rule does not require the producing party to engage in a post-
production review to determine whether any protected communication or information has 
been produced by mistake. But the rule does require the producing party to follow up on any 
obvious indications that a protected communication or information has been produced 
inadvertently.” Id. 
 195. No. DKC 08-1863, 2012 WL 3025111 (D. Md. July 23, 2012). 
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502(b) in the face of an inadvertent production.  The case has unusual facts.  
Defendant iStar subpoenaed plaintiffs’ former counsel, Greenberg Traurig, 
seeking documents in the firm’s possession.196  Plaintiffs’ litigation 
counsel, Womble Carlyle, was given notice of the subpoena.197  Louis 
Rouleau of Womble Carlyle later reached Timothy Bass of Greenberg 
Traurig to discuss the response.198  According to Rouleau’s declaration 
submitted in the hopes of avoiding a privilege waiver, Bass assured 
Rouleau that Greenberg Traurig would handle “the matter properly on its 
own” adding, as Rouleau recalled, something like:  “We got it. We know 
how to respond.”199 
Rouleau then told the court: 
 Given (i) the assurances that Mr. Bass provided to me during our 
conversation on December 15, 2010, (ii) the fact that he is a litigation 
partner in a well-known, national law firm, and (iii) the subpoena’s 
express and repeated limitation of its requests to “non-privileged” 
documents, Womble Carlyle did not further request to coordinate with 
and assist Greenberg Traurig in regard to the subpoena.200 
In January 2011, Greenberg Traurig produced eighty-one documents 
consisting of 4,199 pages of material.201  On January 25, 2011, iStar offered 
to provide a copy of the documents to Womble Carlyle.202  Instead of 
saying “yes,” Womble Carlyle asked for the cost of reproducing the 
documents.203  On March 15, they asked for copies of what Greenberg 
Traurig had produced.204 
On April 13, 2011, Womble Carlyle realized that both privileged and 
work-product protected documents had been produced by Greenberg 
Traurig.205  It sought their return, to no avail.206  It then sought to enforce 
the clawback provisions of a “confidentiality order” that had been entered 
upon agreement of the parties.207  Paragraph 6 of the order read as follows: 
 Non-waiver of privilege for inadvertently disclosed materials.  
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502(d), the inadvertent disclosure of any 
document that is subject to a legitimate claim that the document is subject 
to the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection shall not 
waive the protection or the privilege for either that document or for the 
subject matter of that document.208 
 
 196. Id. at *1. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at *2. 
 200. Id. at *1. 
 201. Id. at *2. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id.  
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Paragraph 7 of the confidentiality order required the recipient of the 
inadvertent disclosures to return or destroy the materials unless the recipient 
disputed the claim in which case the recipient could retain a “single copy” 
of the materials and, in what turned out to be a fateful phrase, seek a 
judicial determination of the matter “pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502.”209 
There was considerable motion practice before a magistrate judge that 
ultimately resulted in a determination that there was no waiver.210  Before 
the district court, iStar successfully objected to this determination. 
Citing Rule 502(d) and (e), the district court recognized that the waiver 
“test” established in Rule 502(b) “may be superseded by court order or 
agreement of the parties.211  However, the district court held that the 
confidentiality order did not supersede Rule 502(b) because the order 
lacked “concrete directives” regarding “each prong of Rule 502(b).”212  The 
district court explained that where a 502(d) order does not “provide 
adequate detail regarding what constitutes inadvertence, what precautionary 
measures are required, and what the producing party’s post-production 
responsibilities are to escape waiver, the court will default to Rule 502(b) to 
fill in the gaps in controlling law.”213  Here, the confidentiality order was 
silent on the precautionary or post-production responsibilities to avoid 
waiver and allowed a disputant to obtain a determination “pursuant to Rule 
502.”214  Thus, the district court held, Rule 502(b) remained applicable to 
Womble Carlyle’s conduct.215 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at *2–3.  The magistrate judge first ruled that the privileged had been waived as 
to all but one of the documents in question, but then, on a motion for reconsideration, 
decided that the privileged had not been waived. Id. 
 211. Id. at *5. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.; see also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 130, 133 
(S.D. W. Va. 2010), overruled sub nom. Felman Prod., Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 2010 WL 
2944777 (S.D. W. Va. July 23, 2010); Luna Gaming-San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, 
LLP, No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).  In Mt. 
Hawley, Rule 502(d) was not mentioned in either opinion.  Mt. Hawley involved Section H 
of a stipulation of the parties that was not embodied in a court order. Mt. Hawley, 271 F.R.D. 
at 128.  The stipulation provided that the return of “an Inadvertently Produced Document 
does not preclude the receiving party from disagreeing with the designation of the document 
as privileged or redacted and re-produced and bringing a Motion to Compel its production 
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 129.  The stipulation also contained 
a procedure for rectifying the disclosure and that contemplated the application of Rule 
502(b):  “Compliance by the producing party with the steps required by this Section H to 
retrieve an Inadvertently Produced Document shall be sufficient, notwithstanding any 
argument by a party to the contrary, to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of FRE 
502(b)(3).” Id.  Luna Gaming involved a protective order that provided that the inadvertent 
disclosure of privileged documents “shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege.” Luna 
Gaming, 2010 WL 275083, at *4.  The order did not address “under what circumstances 
failure to object to the use of inadvertently produced privileged documents waives the 
privilege, which is what the Court must resolve here.” Id.  The district court then applied 
Rule 502(b). Id. at *5–6.  In both cases a waiver was found. 
 214. U.S. Home Corp., 2012 WL 3025111, at *6. 
 215. Id. at *7–8. 
 2013] THE SOLUTION TO THE PRIVILEGE PUZZLE 1617 
Unfortunately, Womble Carlyle provided evidence of only two brief 
phone calls with Greenberg Traurig, only one of which was substantive.216  
“Such minimal efforts to secure the privilege or protection,” the court held, 
“are unreasonable” and amounted to “little more than a broad abdication of 
Womble Carlyle’s responsibility” to Greenberg Traurig.217  The court 
added: 
 Womble Carlyle’s acceptance of Greenberg Traurig’s statements that 
they “got it” and “know how to respond” to the subpoena does not 
constitute a reasonable precaution to protect the attorney-client privilege 
or work product protection.  Womble Carlyle was obligated to do more to 
protect its client and to demand that Plaintiffs’ interests feature more 
prominently in Greenberg Traurig’s efforts.218 
Because the second prong of Rule 502(b) was not satisfied, the court 
explained that it did not have to address the third prong, although it was 
skeptical that Womble Carlyle acted promptly to rectify the error.219 
This case law teaches that a thoroughly drawn Rule 502(d) order should 
disclaim the application of Rule 502(b), and instead identify the order as the 
sole vehicle under which the availability of the privilege should be 
evaluated.  It should declare that any production of a privileged or work-
product protected document is inadvertent.  Indeed, the concept behind Rule 
502(d) is to assist parties in minimizing the cost of reviewing a large 
electronic production to search for privileged documents by affording the 
parties the right to produce a privileged document with the absolute right to 
retrieve it without creating waiver.220  As just stated, the order should 
 
 216. Id. at *8. 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 219. Id. at *9.  The court explained: 
Womble Carlyle requested a copy of the production—but only after requesting a 
cost estimate.  Second, it took nearly another month for Womble Carlyle to review 
the production and discover that the contested documents had been produced; 
Womble Carlyle offers absolutely no explanation for this delay.  And third, other 
than notifying Greenberg Traurig of the disclosures, Womble Carlyle fails to 
explain any other steps it took to rectify the error, let alone when it took such steps. 
Id. 
 220. In a letter from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States 
Senate and House of Representatives, dated September 26, 2007, the problems being 
remedied by Rule 502 were identified:   
In drafting the proposed Rule, the Advisory Committee concluded that the current 
law on waiver of privilege and work product is responsible in large part for the 
rising costs of discovery, especially discovery of electronic information.  In 
complex litigation the lawyers spend significant amounts of time and effort to 
preserve the privilege and work product.  The reason is that if a protected 
document is produced, there is a risk that a court will find a subject matter waiver 
that will apply not only to the instant case and document but to other cases and 
documents as well.  Moreover, an enormous amount of expense is put into 
document production in order to protect against inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged information, because the producing party risks a ruling that even a 
mistaken disclosure can result in a subject matter waiver.  Advisory Committee 
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provide for a return of privileged or protected documents at any time upon 
notice by the producing party of the inadvertent disclosure, or discovery by 
the receiving party that it received a document that appears to be privileged 
or protected.  This latter obligation is imposed on lawyers independent of 
any order under each state’s equivalent to Model Rule 4.4.221  In the case of 
notice from the recipient to the producing party of the disclosure of 
privileged information, the order should provide for a reasonable time 
period within which the producing party must seek return of the 
information.  The order then should provide for a time period within which 
any challenge to the assertion of the privilege must be made. 
Since plaintiffs and defendants typically have similar worries about 
producing privileged or protected documents in any electronic production, 
especially when data-rich parties are in litigation with each other, they 
frequently agree on the terms of a 502(d) order.  But there is already 
precedent that Rule 502 gives courts ample reasons to issue them even over 
a party’s objection.  Illustratively, in S2 Automation LLC v. Micron 
Technology, Inc.,222 Micron proposed entry of a “Non-Waiver and Claw-
Back Order” that provided in pertinent part that: 
 1.  The inadvertent production of privileged or protected material 
during the course of discovery shall not be deemed a waiver or an 
impairment of any claim of privilege or protection, including the attorney-
client privilege and the work-product doctrine, in this or any other state or 
federal proceeding, as to the material inadvertently produced or as to the 
subject matter thereof. 
 2.  In the event counsel to a party producing documents in response to 
a request for production or disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26 (“Producing Party”) discovers an inadvertent production of 
privileged or protected material, the Producing Party shall notify counsel 
to the party who received the inadvertent production (“Receiving Party”) 
in writing and identify the privileged or protected material by Bates 
number.  Upon receipt of a notice of inadvertent disclosure, the Receiving 
Party must refrain from viewing such material or using such material in 
any way, and must follow the Producing Party’s instructions regarding the 
disposition of the material.  To the extent there is a disagreement 
regarding the proper disposition of the material, the Receiving Party shall 
 
members also expressed the view that the fear of waiver leads to extravagant 
claims of privilege.  Members concluded that if there were a way to produce 
documents in discovery without risking subject matter waiver, the discovery 
process could be made much less expensive.  
Rosenthal Letter, supra note 31, at 3.  The advisory committee note to Rule 502(d) begins 
with this sentence:  “Confidentiality orders are becoming increasingly important in limiting 
the costs of privilege review and retention, especially in cases involving electronic 
discovery.” FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note. 
 221. Only six jurisdictions have not yet adopted some form of Model Rule 4.4(b):  
Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Missouri, Texas, and West Virginia. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 
supra note 11, at 1–6. 
 222. No. CIV 11-0884 JB/WDS, 2012 WL 3150387 (D.N.M. July 23, 2012). 
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refrain from using the material unless and until the Court makes a 
determination as to its proper disposition. 
 3.  In the event the Receiving Party believes that the Producing Party 
inadvertently produced privileged or protected material, the Receiving 
Party shall notify the Producing Party in writing and identify the 
suspected privileged or protected material by Bates number within five 
business days of such discovery.  Once the Receiving Party believes that 
there has been an inadvertent disclosure, the Receiving Party must refrain 
from viewing such material or using such material in any way and must 
follow the Producing Party’s instructions regarding the disposition of the 
material.  To the extent there is a disagreement regarding the proper 
disposition of the material, the Receiving Party shall continue to refrain 
from using the material unless and until the Court makes a determination 
as to its proper disposition.223 
S2 objected to entry of the order on two grounds.  First, S2 said that it did 
not want to be in a deposition, seek to use a document, and then have 
Micron object on the ground that the document was inadvertently 
produced.224  Second it said that the attorneys were subject to rules of 
professional conduct and, therefore, there was no need for the order.225  
Citing extensively to the advisory committee notes to Rule 502 regarding 
the role that confidentiality orders can play in limiting the costs of privilege 
review, the court entered the order over these objections.226  There is no 
reason why other courts, similarly informed, should not reach the same 
result. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides uniformity in the law 
of privilege waiver and can provide relief to parties worried about 
inadvertent production of privileged documents in large electronic 
document productions.  Rule 502 should reduce the cost of litigation, a goal 
all litigators should be seeking to advance to achieve the fair administration 
of justice. 
Recent Rule 502(b) case law, however, demonstrates a stubborn 
adherence to former, not uniform case law as part of the application of a 
rule that was intended to create uniformity.  In doing so, some courts have 
entered a time warp—as if e-discovery were nonexistent.  A major goal of 
Rule 502 is to decrease litigation costs.  This means looking at the data 
storage world we face today and eschewing reliance on cases decided in a 
different era that do not account for the costs of restoration, retrieval, and 
review of electronically stored information.  Court orders need to encourage 
the use of technology in smart ways that may not be 100 percent privilege 
protective, meaning that these court orders must protect the privilege in 
 
 223. Id. at *2. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at *3. 
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meaningful ways to avoid stifling the benefits technology can provide to 
reducing litigation costs. 
A Rule 502(d) order achieves these goals.  It can establish inadvertence, 
permit a party to reduce privilege review costs, avoid waiver in any 
proceeding, and avoid any concern about subject matter waiver.  It can 
declare the procedure to be followed to return documents—including 
making the return automatic—and identify the consequences of a failure to 
abide by that procedure.  It can establish a time frame for a determination of 
whether a document is, in fact, privileged or work-product protected.  And 
it can disclaim application of Rule 502(b)(2) or (3), since the design of the 
order is to allow the producing party to produce privileged documents, and 
the order itself will set forth the procedure for return of the documents.227 
The combination of Model Rule 4.4, FRCP 26(b)(5)(b) and 26(f)(3)(D), 
and Rule 502(d) demonstrates that rulemakers and Congress have 
recognized the challenges facing lawyers to protect privileged and work-
product documents while simultaneously trying to control litigation costs 
that are financially choking those lawyers’ clients.  Model Rule 1.6(c) has 
recognized the risk of inadvertent disclosure in the digital world in which 
lawyers operate and tells lawyers that they must make “reasonable efforts to 
prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized 
access to, information relating to the representation of a client.”228 
Rule 502(d) had a quiet beginning.  Properly used, it is an important part 
of the goal to make, in Rule 1229 terms, litigation speedier and less 
expensive without compromising the effective administration of justice. 
 
 227. To illustrate this point, see Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. AIG Fin. Prods. Corp., 
No. 09 Civ. 8285(PGG)(FM), 2013 WL 142503 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013).  In this matter, 
redacted information appeared in metadata associated with various drafts of the minutes of 
an AIG Board of Directors meeting due to vendor error.  There was no question that the 
redacted information was privileged.  Because of the entry of a 502(d) order, the magistrate 
held that there could be no dispute over the right of AIG to “claw back” the minutes: 
[E]ven if AIG or its counsel had dropped the ball (which they did not), the parties 
at my urging had entered into a Rule 502(d) stipulation which I so ordered on 
February 11, 2011.  That stipulation (ECF No. 57) contains one decretal paragraph, 
which provides that “Defendants’ production of any documents in this proceeding 
shall not, for the purposes of this proceeding or any other proceeding in any other 
court, constitute a waiver by Defendants of any privilege applicable to those 
documents, including the attorney-client privilege . . . .”  Accordingly, AIG has the 
right to claw back the minutes, no matter what the circumstances giving rise to 
their production were. 
 
Since Rule 502(d) provides a clear answer—i.e., Brookfield may not use 
documents that I have determined are privileged for any purpose—there is no need 
to consider any sanctions beyond directing the return of all copies (electronic or 
otherwise) of the draft Board minutes. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 228. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2012). 
 229. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
